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Stanley Hopper’s “Eclipse of God and Existential Mistrust” is truly breath­
taking in its brilliance of analysis and breadth of scope. I shall not undertake to 
do justice to it as a whole. Nor will I attempt to present a balanced valuation of 
it, such as is done by Thomas J. J. Altizer. I see my own special contribution, 
rather, as focussing on his interpretation of the thought of Martin Buber—a 
task for which Professor Hopper will grant my competence even where he differs 
with my stance.
Hopper recognizes that Buber would dispute his speaking of the “I-Thou 
relation” as a metaphor (page 47). Yet Hopper clearly does not understand 
from what standpoint Buber claims in I and Thou that “Thou” is not a metaphor. 
For Buber “Thou” is not a pronoun that stands for some noun, a linguistic symbol 
of some transcendent reality. It is the word of address that is spoken from within 
the relationship and that gives no information whatsoever concerning the nature 
and essence of one’s partner in dialogue. When Hopper suggests that “Thou” 
is Buber’s name for Tillich’s God beyond “God” or for the “Transcendent,” he 
reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of Buber’s thought that necessarily 
impairs everything else he has to say on this subject. For Buber, religious symbols 
are symbols of the I-Thou relationship, not of God as he is in himself. Therefore 
the “Thou” is not, in fact, separable from the saying of “Thou” within an actual 
I-Thou relationship. It cannot refer to any designation of God, however trans­
cendent and ineffable. Buber’s “eternal Thou” is not a symbol of “God.” “God,” 
for Buber, is a symbol of the “eternal Thou,” and the eternal Thou is the eternally 
renewed Thou of the concrete, particular I-Thou relationship.
Hopper seemingly reverses this position and takes seriously—as “another side” 
of Buber’s teaching a “certain literalism” which “invades this sense of the Mystery 
and coerces it towards the traditional dualistic models.”
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His language continues to assert the terminological screen of “trans­
cendence” and the “Absolute,” of that which is “over against me,” of 
“holding fast to the living God,” of betweenness and encounter and of 
Pascal’s “God of Abraham,” phrases held not metaphorically or archety- 
pally, but as he says, in a “real,” “existential” and “actual” sense of 
which language as metaphor would somehow seem to deprive it (page
49).
Actually, Hopper is making the same error as before, namely, imagining that 
the “Thou” of the I-Thou relationship refers by itself, apart from the relationship, 
to something outside of it. The only question for Hopper is whether that re-
ineffable reality of the Absolute, grounded in the depths of Jung’s collective 
unconscious so that it may have “archetypal” significance without literal mean­
ing, or whether it is taken as a literal, hence dualistic referent. Buber rejects all 
three of these possibilities in favor of the concreteness of the unique happening 
and event. If he does indeed espouse “betweenness” and “meeting” (“Encounter” 
is a translation for Begegnung that Buber did not like or use.), that is not because 
of any “literalness” of reference but the exact and true opposite—a meaning that 
cannot be divorced from the mutual knowing of dialogue.
While Hopper makes no secret of his preference for Heidegger over Buber, 
one is nonetheless astonished by the distortion that this preference introduces 
into his mere reporting of Buber’s position. Accepting as his own Heidegger’s 
goal of recovering for Western consciousness a “fundamental ontology,” Hopper 
transmutes Buber’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of being into a concession. 
It gives evidence, Hopper claims, that “in the zones of ontological reflection 
Martin Buber’s thinking remains enmeshed in the traditional rhetoric.” Against 
all the evidence of everything that Buber has written, Hopper proceeds to con­
clude that Buber’s “summation symbol, ‘God,’ often sounds like that which Wal­
lace Stevens referred to as ‘that Gold Self aloft, Alone ... looking down,’ and 
hence untouched by what is most radical in the metaphors of‘death,’ ‘absence,’ 
‘loss,’ ‘disappearance,’ and even ‘eclipse,’ which terms ... prevent our wishful 
return into that hermetic Eden of intellectualistically oriented thinking which 
has comprised the tradition of Western metaphysics from Aristotle down .. 
(page 50). I wish Buber were still alive to enjoy, as he truly would have, the 
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spectacle of his thought being subsumed under the tradition of Western meta­
physics!
What Buber actually writes is radically different from what Hopper reads 
through the lenses of his Heideggerian approach. In the context of a concise but 
thoroughgoing critique of Heidegger’s teaching of the rebirth of divine images 
through man’s concept-clarifying thought, Buber states:
This is not the place for a critical discussion of Heidegger’s theory of 
being. I shall only confess that for me a concept of being that means any­
thing other than the inherent fact of all existing being, namely, that it 
exists, remains insurmountably empty. That is, unless I have recourse 
to religion and see in it a philosophical characterization of the Godhead 
similar to that of some Christian scholastics and mystics who contem­
plate, or think that they contemplate, the Godhead as it is in itself, 
thus as prior to creation. It should also be noted, however, that one of 
them, and the greatest of them all, Meister Eckhart, follows in Plato’s 
footsteps by placing above the wr est Deus, as the higher truth, the 
sentence, “Est enim (Deus) super esse et ens ” Compare this with Heidegger’s 
statement (Platons Lebre, 76): “ ‘Being’—that is not God and it is not a 
ground of the world. Being is more than all that exists and is, nonetheless, 
nearer than any existing thing, be it... an angel or God. Being is the 
nearest thing.” If by the last sentence, however, something other is 
meant than that I myself am, and not indeed as the subject of a cogito, but 
as my total person, then the concept of being loses for me the character 
of conceivability that obviously it eminently possesses for Heidegger.1
1 Martin Buber, Eclipse of God. Studies in the Relation between Religion and Philosophy (New 
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), “Religion and Modem Thinking,” trans, by Maurice 
Friedman, p. 73 f.
So also with Jung. Hopper’s failure to notice Buber’s critique of the psychologiz­
ing of reality makes him so misunderstand Buber’s thesis that Jung has con­
tributed to the “eclipse of God” as to convert this into the judgment that Jung 
fits into the “God is dead” category. Neither did Buber ever suggest, as Hopper 
claims, that the unconscious is “an irrational function of my rational ego.” Nor 
does Buber’s carefully documented critique of Jung’s relegating transcendence 
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to a symbol of the psychologically immanent justify Hopper’s characterization 
of Buber’s aim as that of preserving the I-Thou relationship “in its externality,” 
whatever that could possibly mean. What Buber has said is that those who con­
fine God to the transcendent make him less than he is, but those who reduce 
him to the immanent mean something other than God. If this latter contributes, 
in Buber’s opinion, to the “eclipse of God,” it is not because he is attached to 
any dualistic transcendence, but because he is suspicious of a God reached by the 
removal of the otherness and uniqueness met in the “lived concrete.”
From misunderstanding and misinterpretation Hopper proceeds to amateur 
psychoanalysis: “Buber’s defensiveness arises from the sense of threat that he 
feels at the point where Jung’s theory of the Unconscious subverts the classical 
model of a person, and thus, by extension threatens the adequacy of the ‘I-Thou 
relation’ model” (page 50). Although Hopper later discusses Buber’s concept of 
“unmasking” from “Hope for This Hour” (Pointing the Way), he misses Buber’s 
central point, namely, that the game of unmasking the motives of others quickly 
becomes mutual and leads to an existential mistrust that makes it impossible to 
attend to vfar the other says because one is so busy figuring out vby he says it! 
Since Buber has made his critique of both Heidegger and Jung in great detail, 
with careful documentation, and with a full philosophical explanation of its 
significance, one might more easily ask what makes Hopper so defensive about 
Buber’s criticism of his two intellectual heroes that he cannot grasp its plain 
intention. No one who has read I and Tbou with any openness, much less Buber’s 
other works, could imagine that Buber is concerned with “the primacy of the 
rationalist ego,” or “the person ... deprived of its depth dimension,” or “a 
mind in the body over against God and the world,” or a “cerebral and assertive” 
dialogue as opposed to one that is “watchful and attentive” of “the creative flan 
that comes out of silence” (page 50). Such gross misreading betrays a dogmatism 
based on a very un-Zen-like dualism between “good” nondualistic terms and 
“bad” classical, dualistic, absolutistic, or intellectualist terms. From these 
dichotomies arises Hopper’s evident inability to imagine that paradoxical com­
bination of transcendence and immanence that lies at the heart of Buber’s philo­
sophy and, in different form, of Zen Buddhism.
Hopper mistrusts Buber’s view of mistrust as not sufficiently radical. But 
when he deals with that unmasking of which Buber speaks in connection with 
Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, he entirely misses the distortion that existential 
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mistrust inevitably brings in its wake—the belief that one has ideas and ideals 
while the other has only rationalizations and ideologies, to be seen through 
and reinterpreted but never to be taken as a valid expression of a really other 
point of view. On the contrary, Hopper sees “unmasking” only as a positive 
phenomenon which strips off pretensions and presumptions and confronts “us 
with the primary mysteries of being and self-identity,” releasing us “into a fresh 
understanding of the nature and ‘meaning' of things.”
Hopper sees his thought as new and more radical than Buber’s, whereas I see 
Hopper’s position as an up-to-date essentialism of a traditional Western or 
Hindu metaphysical nature, without a trace of existential anguish. This may 
account in part for his total failure to grasp the fundamental issues of ontology 
between Heidegger and Buber. He equates “Buber’s existential relations” with 
Heidegger’s “entities” as elements for which we lack the grammar that would 
enable us to grasp them in their Being (page 54). He thus reduces Buber’s sphere 
of the between to the “ontic,” the merely existential, and accords to Heidegger’s 
hypostasized non-relational Being the sole conceivable ontological reality. But 
Buber has said repeatedly and in all clarity that to him it is the “between” itself 
that is the “ontological,” and he has denied the possibility of reaching any 
“Being” through plumbing the depths of the self or even as the ground of self 
and world.
When Hopper deals with Buber’s interpretation of the Hcraclitean “logos” 
in “What Is Common to All” QTbe Knowledge of Man), he again ignores the real 
issue between Buber and Heidegger—whether “man” may bring about the 
“unconcealment of Being” directly or only through the “between,” i.e., in that 
common “speech-with-meaning” Qogoif through which he builds a common 
cosmos. Instead Hopper claims that Buber’s use of the term logoi “tends to func­
tion rationalistically, losing its ratios of physical depth and losing its thrust as 
one metaphor in a cluster of vitalistic metaphors which, taken together, convey 
something of Heraclitus’ vision of things.’ But Buber has used Heraclitus’ logos 
in the context of an interpretation of his “vitalistic metaphors and figurations of 
the unity of opposites.” The very term “unity of opposites” figures centrally in 
Buber’s own thought from his 1901 essay on Jacob Boehme, his 1904 dissertation 
on Nicolas of Cusa, his 1911 essay on “The Teaching of the Tao,” his 1913 
chapter on “Polarity” in Daniel to and through the whole of his mature thought. 
“The unity of the contraries is the mystery at the innermost core of the dialogue,”
166
VIEWS & REVIEWS
Buber himself wrote. Not only has Hopper merely put Heidegger forward in 
place of Buber without facing the issue between them, he has missed the heart 
of Buber’s philosophy—the coincidentia oppositorum.
Hopper finds the figural terms of Buber’s metaphor of “eclipse” “not radical 
enough to embrace the paradoxical sense of desolation and release which we today 
experience.” But has Hopper really experienced the desolation that arises, not 
out of some Socratic, Kierkegaardian, or Nietzschean dialectic, but out of the 
“hiding of God” in the time of Auschwitz? Does he understand Buber’s refusal 
in the name of “the Job of Auschwitz” to put up with early being, his insistence 
on struggling for its redemption, and his readiness to meet, in whatever form 
he comes, “our cruel and kind Lord who is again and still a hiding one”? Has 
Hopper even asked himself what commentary Heidegger’s Naziism throws on 
his attempt to unconceal Being minus genuine dialogue with real otherness? 
Hopper locates “the place where the seeming contradictions of theophany and 
reversal are occurring” as “contemporary literature” which“embodies the enigma 
that it seeks to solve.” In so doing he is in danger of elevating literature to a 
sphere above life. If there is a “new myth that is forming at the heart of the 
world,” then we cannot look for its first signs in literature and art alone, as 
Hopper suggests, but in the full historical reality, including that Dialogue with 
the Absurd (to use my own terminology) that is the only stance that does not 
evade those historical contradictions that we cannot make meaningful either 
within a rational world-view or a mystic insight into the heart of things.
When Hopper himself comes to discussing the “death of God,” we are con­
firmed in what we already suspected: the provincial framework of his system of 
denials. He equates “God’s failure” with that “recession of Christendom’s sym­
bolic system, along with the classical world-view,” which “renders everything 
uncertain.” No wonder that he cannot understand the non-Christian and non­
Greek nature of Buber’s thought. What Hopper is really talking about is a 
chapter in the intellectual history of the Western world rather than those holo­
causts and abysses of modem history that have put man himself in question.
The goal of Hopper’s paper, as he states it, is “to accomplish the negative and 
to focus our uncertainty infinitely in order that the Deity, the positive, that 
which is already given, might be glimpsed through his creative Presence.” This 
Kierkegaardian type of dialectic is full of intellectual paradoxes, but it misses the 
genuinely existential and historical ones. Put in another way, it is the difference
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
between “dialectic” and “dialogue.” Dialectic, whether it is seen as individual 
reasoning or the sweep of world-historical consciousness A la Hegel, is essentially 
monological. In its perspective existential mistrust and the failure of dialogue 
does not really threaten contact with reality but in the end serves to promote 
it. Hence even in its progression of opposites and its radical negations and affirma­
tions, it is still an essentialist approach. For the life of dialogue, in contrast, the 
existential mistrust that results from and exacerbates the failure of dialogue 
cannot be overcome intellectually or dialectically but only through an event of 
new meeting—through a renewal of trust that comes, if at all, only out of an honest 
facing of existential contradictions. Nothing expresses so clearly this radical 
contrast between Hopper’s essentially optimistic and essentialist dialectic and 
Buber’s “eclipse of God” as the statement that Martin Buber wrote on my book 
Problematic Rebel:
The theme is the revolt of man against an existence emptied of mean­
ing, the existence after the so-called “death of God.” This emptying of 
meaning is not to be overcome through the illusionary program of a free 
“creation of values,” as we know it in Nietzsche and Satre. One must 
withstand this meaninglessness, must suffer it to the end, must do battle 
with it undauntedly, until out of the contradiction experienced in con­
flict and suffering, meaning shines forth anew.2
2 Maurice Friedman, Problematic Rebel: Melville, Dostoievsky, Kafka, Camus, 2nd revised 
& radically reorganized edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books 
(paperback), 1970).
In his last explicit statement on the “eclipse of God,” Buber pointed out that 
its divine side is what the Hebrew Bible speaks of as “the hiding of God.” This 
is an event between God and man rather than something that in any way breaks 
off the divine revelation, but it is a real event that no dialectic can conjure away:
One may also call what is meant here a silence of God’s or rather, 
since I cannot conceive of any interruption of the divine revelation, a 
condition that works on us as a silence of God. One is right to see here a 
“most troubling question.” These last years in a great searching and 
questioning, seized ever anew by the shudder of the now, I have arrived 
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no further than that I now distinguish a revelation through the hiding 
of the face, a speaking through the silence. The eclipse of God can be 
seen with one’s eyes, it will be seen.
He, however, who today knows nothing other to say than, “Sec there, 
it grows lighter!” he leads into error.3
3 Paul Arthur Schilpp and Maurice Friedman, editors, Tbe Philosophy of Martin Buber 
volume of Tbe Library of Living Philosophers (LaSalle, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing 
Co., i<x57)> Martin Buber, “Replies to My Critics,” trans, by Maurice Friedman, p. 716.
Dialectic, for all its dynamism, is still bound to the subject-object way of 
knowing—the very dimension that Hopper imagines he has transcended. After 
his progress through Heidegger, Jung, Wallace Stevens, Zen, and so much else, 
Hopper ends with Rilke, or more exactly with Rilke interpreted in a subjective- 
objective duality that Rilke himself overcame in his Duino Elegies:
Rilke proposed that perhaps we have made a mistake in trying to 
look at God, thus making an object of him, standing over against us; 
perhaps we ought, as he said, to see as God sees—in which case, God 
would be behind us, so to speak, like the enigma a priori, and we would 
be looking in the same direction as he is looking, seeing as he sees, 
participating, that is, in his creative life, even as the poet today strives to 
be one with his poem, participating thereby in the ontology of utter­
ance, provided of course that the utterance comes from a psychical 
source deeper than the cavern beneath his inmost cave. (p. 69)
In Tbe Knowledge of Man, both in “What Is Common to AU” and in “The Word 
That Is Spoken,” Buber put forward an “ontology of utterance” based squarely 
on the reality of the life between man and man. But Hopper totally misses this, 
even as a theoretical possibility, just as he misses Buber’s distinction between 
existence as Gegenuber or Gegenstand (“w-4-w” or “object”) when he speaks of 
God as “an object... standing over against us.” Hopper only knows God as 
object or as subject.
The third alternative, of a God who is met in the “between,” i.e. in “the 
meeting with the nameless Meeter,” but not in any knowledge of some “object” 
that is met, is simply left out. When Hopper wants to go beyond the merely 
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personal, he falls into that archetypal psychologizing of God and existence 
evident in his referring the “ontology of utterance” to a “psychological source” 
more profound than the individual himself. What troubles me most of all in 
Hopper’s stance is not the religious dimension per se but the human. In turning 
away from the meeting with what transcends the self to the Self alone, he does 
not do justice to the lived reality of existence itself, which does not take place 
within the psyche, no matter how profoundly conceived. Against Hopper I 
repeat what I wrote at the end of my Introductory Essay to The Knowledge of Man: 
“Martin Buber’s philosophical anthropology refers us with a profundity unequall­
ed in our time to man’s still unfathomed relation to being and meaning.”4
4 Martin Buber, The Knowledge of Man, edited with an Introductory Essay (Chapter I) 
by Maurice Friedman (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 58.
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